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17 June 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

TEROUGE : [ ] Acting  
Special Assistant to Chief, FP

FROM : [ ] Chairman, Inter-Office  
Telecommunications Advisory Committee

SUBJECT : Technical Monitoring of U.S. Broadcasts  
in Target Areas

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#### PROBLEM

1. To establish a program for monitoring the intelligibility of U.S. International Broadcasting from within the Soviet Bloc.

#### STATED POLICY

2. NSC-169, paragraph 2, directed that certain monitoring for the appraisal of U.S. international broadcasting be established in U.S. missions behind the Iron Curtain.

3. Subsequent reports on NSC-169, all inter-agency committees concerned with U.S. broadcasting, and three successive Annual Conferences on U.S. broadcasting to the Soviet orbit have emphasized the necessity for regular monitoring of U.S. broadcasting from within the Soviet Bloc. Directors of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation have reiterated the need for accurate and regular monitoring data from within the Soviet Bloc.

#### BACKGROUND

4. As a result of 90-day temporary duty assignment of technicians [ ] in 1954, based on the requirement of NSC-169, paragraph 2, it was determined that productive monitoring could be accomplished in U.S. missions behind the Iron Curtain, and it was planned to place trained monitors (technicians) [ ] on a permanent basis.

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5. Efforts in the last 30 months to establish these technical monitors have not yet been successful. Meanwhile, broadcasters have had to rely upon their own monitors established at locations on the periphery of the Bloc and the bits and pieces of monitoring data which Foreign Service Officers within the Soviet Bloc have from time to time voluntarily provided. Additional information on reception in the target areas, often lacking definitiveness, has been obtained from legal travellers, defectors, and letter writers.

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#### DISCUSSION

7. Peripheral monitoring provides valuable information on reception in adjacent parts of the target areas and on sky-wave jamming of our broadcasting. However, satisfactory evaluation of the technical effectiveness of U.S. international broadcasting (especially as it is affected by ground-wave jamming) can be accomplished only by provision of monitoring throughout the target area. An adequate continuing program of within-the-target-area monitoring must include, among other things:

a. Reception observations of U.S. broadcasts by all U.S. mission personnel whenever possible while travelling within the target country.

b. Consistent and scheduled monitoring for this purpose at the U.S. Embassy or Legation (or in the living quarters of the Mission Staff).

c. Coordination and support of these activities by an individual with suitable technical training in broadcast monitoring.

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Experience gained in connection with the voluntary reporting of data on reception and on jamming by Foreign Service Officers indicates that non-technical Mission personnel may be able to supply valuable data without serious detriment to their regularly assigned duties, provided that adequate equipment is available and careful guidance can be given.

8. An individual with training in broadcast monitoring is required at each U.S. mission to perform the following necessary tasks:

- a. Explain broadcaster's monitoring requirements and provide sufficient technical guidance to non-technical personnel to enable them to make meaningful broadcast reception observations while travelling and at the Embassy or Legation as required.
- b. Maintain and calibrate receiving equipment.
- c. Where feasible, instruct and guide non-technical personnel in the recognition of jamming signals and in the location and identification of jamming stations.
- d. Transmit monitoring reports to Washington.

For the purposes of this paper, such an individual might be called a "program coordinator."

Because of his technical training, a specialist assigned to meet USCIB requirements would be readily qualified to perform the above tasks. However, these tasks do not require the same degree of technical training as is necessary for COMINT and ELINT collection. It is believed that a non-technical person of good receptivity, through a training course of one month or less, could acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to perform these tasks.

The time which program coordinators would devote to monitoring support tasks will vary from country to country, depending upon the scale of jamming, the number of mission personnel, etc. However, it is recognized that the major role of the officer appointed as program coordinator at the Mission will be concerned with his principal assignment, and that he will perform his tasks as program coordinator only on a part-time basis.

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9. The basic problem in establishing a broadcast monitoring program at U.S. missions in the Soviet Bloc arises from limitations upon the number of personnel who can be assigned to such posts, and the consequent heavy burden of work and responsibility imposed upon inadequate staffs. Even if additional personnel can be made available, it is clear that their numbers will be limited and that there are many tasks, now either not performed at all or performed in a limited manner, which the additional personnel would be called upon to perform. It is also noted that monitoring of U.S. broadcasts is an activity not related to the intelligence objectives stemming from NSCID-4, but derives its importance and priority from the basic need for auditing our broadcasting effort according to NSC-169 as stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. It is within this context that steps must be taken to establish a monitoring program.

10. The filling of an additional position within a Mission by a specialist qualified for COMINT and ELINT as outlined in the USCIB paper mentioned in paragraph 6, would readily meet the needs for a U.S. broadcast monitoring program, provided proper priority were given to broadcast monitoring activities. Because, however, the technical tasks associated with broadcast monitoring are of a lower order of specialization and are part time, it may be of more immediate value to fill any additional officer position which might become available at a mission by a person who, although he might be assigned to perform primarily any one of a variety of tasks, would also be technically trained before his departure to perform the technical broadcast monitoring duties outlined in paragraph 8. If in any case a choice of persons for technical support to broadcast monitoring included a U.S. broadcast impact analyst, it is probable that the latter, because of concentration on broadcast content, would have the keenest motivation and interest in broadcast monitoring.

11. In Tab B, there is indicated the present officer strength (excluding administrative, secretarial, guard, and similar personnel) at each U.S. Mission behind the Iron Curtain together with the reasons for the limitation imposed. It cannot be determined when, or under what circumstances additional positions will become available which will permit the assignment of additional personnel having as part of their assigned duties the carrying out of the technical tasks associated with and necessary for broadcast monitoring listed in paragraph 8.

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12. Pending such determination (which may well be long delayed) certain steps may be feasible which, while not resulting in an over-all satisfactory receipt of broadcast reception data, would significantly improve the present situation. Specifically, it may be possible to arrange for the technical training of Foreign Service Officers under assignment to existing positions in U.S. Missions. These officers, although they could not be expected to carry out completely the tasks listed in paragraph 8, could provide a degree of technical support which would significantly enhance the amount and quality of data obtained from non-technical personnel.

13. Finally, it should be noted that NEC-169, Annex A, states that "Additionally, it is considered desirable that ... the Embassy be provided with a sufficient number of receivers appropriate in size and desirable for that purpose which could be used by Embassy personnel on the occasions that they are permitted to travel in the hinterland." The U.S. missions concerned have already been supplied with a limited quantity of portable radio receivers commercially available. The receivers are, however, deficient in some respects, particularly in that they do not permit quick and sufficiently accurate tuning to the specific frequencies used by VOA, RFE, and RIN within a frequency spectrum crowded with other types of broadcasting. The effectiveness of any program for broadcast listening, whether concerned (as this one is) with the fact and degree of reception or with the content of the broadcast, would be significantly increased by improved equipment.

#### 14. CONCLUSIONS

a. An adequate program of broadcast monitoring at U.S. missions within the Soviet Bloc must be established, and can be established by (1) obtaining the cooperation of all personnel assigned to each mission to make observations while travelling within the country and at the Embassy itself; and (2) providing technical assistance.

b. The need for technical assistance can reasonably be met by the training and limited use of a non-technical officer assigned to an existing position at each mission concerned.

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d. The availability of more adequate equipment will significantly enhance the value of the broadcast monitoring program.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

15. It is recommended that the DCI propose to the OCB a program for monitoring U.S. international broadcasting from within the Soviet Bloc on the following terms:

a. The State Department will instruct the Chiefs of U.S. Missions in Iron Curtain countries to establish a continuing program of monitoring of U.S. international broadcasting which would utilize the services of all possible Mission personnel to provide maximum possible monitoring while on travel status, and would provide a reasonable amount of regular scheduled monitoring at each Mission itself.

b. The State Department will instruct the Chiefs of Missions to appoint now one officer assigned to each Mission as a program coordinator in order to provide the limited technical support to non-technical Mission personnel engaged in broadcast monitoring.

c. In order to insure continuity of the monitoring program thereafter, when it becomes necessary or desirable for any reason, e.g., rotation, availability of better qualified personnel, etc., to reassign the functions of the program coordinator, such reassignment will be determined by either the Ambassador or, where appropriate, by representatives of the agencies concerned.

d. CIA (OSI) will provide headquarters guidance and support, through the State Department, to the broadcast monitoring program and will provide the necessary technical training to officers assigned to U.S. Missions.

e. CIA (OC) will provide a receiver having the maximum desirable qualities for use in the broadcast monitoring program.

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#### Attachments:

1. Tab A
2. Tab B

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